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Women as a Sign of the New? Appointments to South Africa's Constitutional Court since 1994.
'So the Old strode in disguised as the New, but it brought the New with it in its triumphal
procession and presented it as the Old'. (Brecht 1939) .
In this article I take as my focus a newly established institution and explore some of the ways in which this institution makes claims to 'being new' in a broader sense -of claiming to offer a new way of doing things or representing change. These questions are explored through South Africa's Constitutional Court, established as part of South Africa's transition to democracy in the 1990s. Within South Africa's transition many institutions of government were retained and repurposed, the Constitutional Court was a very important exception to this. Prior to 1994 South Africa had not had a Constitutional Court with the power of judicial review, or a Constitution which enshrined both political and socio-economic rights for its citizens. Importantly the Constitutional Court's newness was at the centre of the broader claims being made about the establishment of a 'new' democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa in the wake of apartheid and colonialism. Indeed, the Court in its role as protector and promoter of the new Constitution was also an institution at the vanguard of the fuller transformation of South African governance and society envisaged by that Constitution.
An important element in this broadly conceived transformation was gender equality and an improved representation of women within politics. As Shireen Hassim has noted, women came to occupy a 'peculiar status' during South Africa's transition to democracy as the 'proving ground' or 'marker' of the extent to which the post-apartheid agreement was viewed as 'inclusive, participatory and permeable to socially excluded groupings ' (2006, 162) . The Constitution ensured that the courts would be considered one of those proving grounds when it stipulated in Section 174(2) that the judiciary should reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa. This article traces the story of women's 'peculiar status' since 1994 in relation to the Constitutional Court and the South African judiciary.
Here 'being new' is understood as an institutional attribute, which has to be constructed and claimed and can be disputed. It renders 'old' and 'new' unstable political claims, entangled with performance, bodies and power, as in Bertolt Brecht's poem 'Parade of the Old New' quoted above. New
Institutionalists in recent years have begun to theorise 'new' institutions through their work on institutional origins and design. Various concepts have been suggested that try to capture the complexity of old, new, borrowing, remembering and forgetting of rules and norms that go into the process of establishing an institution, including 'bricolage', 'matrix' and 'nested newness' (Leach and Lowndes 2007; North 1990; Lowndes 2005; MacKay 2009 ). It has been lamented by Streeck and Thelen that underlying this is a 'widespread propensity to explain what might seem to be new as just another version of the old' (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 1) . I want to add to this emergent theorising by foregrounding the politics of claiming to be new or old. In this article I aim to explore the ways in which gendered and raced bodies can become entangled with the politics of newness.
I am building upon a well-developed critical literature that analyses 'new' institutional forms or legal state solutions to inequality and alerts us to 'the old' that lurks within; exploring the way in which existing power hierarchies and unequal structures are re-inscribed through processes of institutional change and reform that ostensibly aim to tackle them. 1 An important concept within this literature is that of 'backlash' or counter-mobilisation, used to describe the reaction of those in power, or supportive of the status quo, to a given social or political change (see Kenney 2013, 136) . As Sally J. Kenney notes, the importance of this concept lies in its assumption of newness; despite the fact that backlash might be based upon historical patterns of inequality or oppression it is, in fact, a new manifestation. The political reform or social inclusion 'has unleashed a new force that is distinct' from 'plain old' sexism or racism (Kenney 2013, 136) . I want to suggest here that to follow the mutations of sexism or racism in a 'new' institution we need to watch closely how the politics of newness unfolds and how bodies are entangled with these politics. This approach is inspired by Sara Ahmed's work on diversity policies within UK Higher Education institutions, in which she urges us to take note of the 'work' that certain bodies are asked to do for institutions, especially those historically excluded from institutions such as women or people of colour (Ahmed 2013) . Ahmed notes that processes of institutional inclusion, or being 'folded in' to an institution, are not without consequences for those who are included. As she puts it: historically excluded bodies 'are not then simply or only included by an act of inclusion. In being "folded in", another story unfolds' (Ahmed 2013, 164) .
In laying claim to newness an institution opens up contestation over just what is 'old' and what is 'new'. Judgements might fall upon a particular set of rules, a norm of behaviour, or on bodies. When institutional claims about newness are being made through bodies then gender, race, sexuality and class, as ways of reading bodies, become simultaneously ways of reading institutional change and continuity.
To notice that bodies and institutions are co-constitutive is not a novel insight; it is one that underpins the study of gender and the project of Feminist Institutionalism. This approach rests upon a view of institutions as 'living scripts' that are constituted by everyday, embodied performances of rules and norms (Puwar 2010, 298) . The aim here is to develop our understanding of the role bodies might play in processes of institutional change, or to put it another way: how intersecting performances of race or gender might be read as a sign of the new and what the implications of such readings might be.
In exploring these questions through a court the arguments here build upon an emergent scholarship on gender and judging, and in particular the work of Sally J. Kenney. Kenney has urged those studying gender and judging to move 'beyond' the question of whether women judges decide cases differently than men (2008, 88) . She argues that women need to be represented in the ranks of the judiciary, not because they necessarily bring a special 'feminine' perspective but because their inclusion normalizes women's power and authority. Kenney's approach helps shift our focus from searching for women's difference to tracing the specific dynamics of inclusion. When studying the incorporation of women into judiciaries from which they have been historically excluded Kenney warns us to expect to see differences in 'how each individual woman "does" gender' and calls for us to see gender 'one judge at a time ' (2013, 45; 2008, 101) .
In her work on the first woman judge to be appointed to the UK Supreme Court Kenney traces the way in which the absence of women from higher judicial office in the UK was brought onto the policy agenda in 2003 by a 'critical community' that included feminists inside and outside the legal professions, who linked the absence of women to discussions of the need to modernize the judiciary. In this context she shows how Justice Hale's appointment as the first woman Supreme Court judge was used to lay claim to the newly established Court's modernity. She also reveals the limitations of the strategy adopted by the critical community to 'instrumentally' link their calls for more women judges to the broader agenda of modernization -the linkage was 'enough to break the barrier of a woman first' but did not 'generate a deeper commitment to gender equality' (Kenney 2013, 107) . In this article I argue that in South Africa the Rachel E. Johnson, Politics & Gender, Vol. 10, Issue 4 (2014) , pp 595-621.
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range of agendas that lay behind the establishment of the Constitutional Court and the drive for diversity in the judiciary has resulted in a complex entanglement of race and gender with the politics of newness.
My enquiry is structured through a historical narrative of appointments to the South African Constitutional Court since 1994 which pays attention to the ways in which historically excluded bodies, women and black men, have been included into this new space within the judiciary. What becomes apparent is that the relationship between bodies, politics and institutions has not been straightforward or stable. Some bodies have been more 'emotionally resonant' than others at specific moments, acting as conductors or amplifiers for debate (Kenney 2013, 57 
The 'new' South Africa and the Constitutional Court
The establishment of the South African Constitutional Court occurred within the context of the political transition from apartheid minority-rule to post-apartheid democracy, and was an example of, and a contributor to, a globalised expansion of judicial power or 'judicialization' of politics at the end of the twentieth century (Malleson 2006, 3) . As in other places that have seen an expansion of judicial power, the South African transition was accompanied by a renewed focus on the demographics of the judiciary and processes of judicial appointment (Malleson 2006, 3) . The push for a more diverse judiciary in South Africa was intertwined with the establishment of the new Constitutional Court, and the impetus for both was shaped by a number of overlapping and contesting agendas: a need for a renewal of judicial legitimacy and authority; an urge to protect hard-won rights and freedoms; and a wish to create and sustain the independence of the judiciary from executive power.
As Heinz Klug has put it, the South African transition to democracy was shaped by a strong 'urge for legal continuity' that came from elements within both the anti-apartheid liberation organisations and the former ruling white minority (Klug 2010, 15) . 2 As such the transition from minority rule to democracy required a transformation of the law -from that which had upheld and legitimized apartheid to that which underpinned a new legal order enshrining equality. Under the 1993 Interim Constitution and then the 1996 final Constitution South Africa moved from a system built around parliamentary sovereignty to one with a supreme written Constitution. However, the existing personnel and institutions of South Africa's apartheid-era legal system were largely retained. This included a judiciary that was widely perceived to have done more to underpin and uphold apartheid through law than acting as a bulwark against that system's worst injustices. As a result it lacked legitimacy and the moral authority to challenge the new democratic government, and many also doubted apartheid-era judges' commitment to the new equality enshrined in the Constitution. This was a predicament often expressed in bodily terms; after 1994 'the judiciary could not consist of ninety-seven percent white male judges and expect legitimacy' (Cowan 2006, 299) .
The decision to establish a new Constitutional Court, with new judges, which had jurisdiction over constitutional matters was a response to the urge to protect the Bill of Rights, and was an immediate means of side-stepping the lack of trust in the existing judiciary and its lack of legitimacy. A Constitutional commitment to transform the composition of the judiciary was the more long-term solution to its embodied lack of legitimacy. However, the establishment of a new appointments process run by a 7 Judicial Services Commission (JSC), which ultimately strengthened the claim that the post-1994 judiciary would be 'new' was also in part a response to a third agenda: to build-up the structural independence of the judiciary as a check on the power of future executives.
Apartheid-era judicial appointments were regarded as secretive, politicised and in the gift of the executive branch of government (Wesson and Du Plessis 2009, 3 Parliament and the legal professions with a significant role in making judicial appointments (Spitz and Chaskalson 2000, 206) . Once established the JSC was quickly incorporated into the Constitutional Court's institutional claims to newness (see Mandela's speech at the Court's inauguration discussed below). In general terms it has been viewed by the ANC as a vehicle for transforming the judiciary (Malleson 1999, 39) . However, it is important to remember its origins, as Spitz and Chaskalson have described it, as the Democratic Party's 'most notable prize' during the negotiations process (2000, 198) .
Since 1994 the JSC has thus also been viewed within liberal critiques of the ANC's political dominance, as a means of maintaining judicial independence.
The 1996 Constitution stipulates two things about the judiciary. [Insert Table 1 here].
Appointments to the Constitutional Court since 1994
What is presented here is a historical narrative of the appointments to the Constitutional Court since 1994, reconstructed through media reports of the process. It does not aim to be comprehensive and cannot cover all twenty four appointments made during this period in the same depth. The appointments made over the last two decades are summarised in Table 2 , showing the dates at which judges have joined and left the Constitutional Court bench, the route by which they were appointed and, in broad terms, their professional background prior to joining the Court, and their gender and race. 5 I have collected and 9 analysed articles from South Africa's major English-language newspapers that reported and commented upon Constitutional Court appointments since 1994. 6 In the historical narrative which follows I have focused upon the ways in which the contested process of transformation and the Constitutional Court's newness has been read-off and articulated-through gendered and raced bodies at particular moments.
[Insert Table 2 here].
In general terms the South African debates over transformation resemble those that have greeted attempts to diversify the judiciary in other countries. Perceived contradictions between the public and private, or formal and informal, aspects of the judicial appointments process, what a broader literature on judicial appointments refers to as the 'gap between theory and practice', have continued to provide moments for contesting transformation (Malleson 2006, 5) . Many elements of 'backlash' against judicial diversification that Kenney identifies are visible in the press discourse on Constitutional Court appointments. As Kenney notes, backlash bring 'powerful narratives to the fore' and uppermost among these is the 'idea that representativeness and diversity are the enemies of merit ' (2013, 139) . The appointment of women and black men is read as a sign of 'the abandonment of merit and the primacy of special interest politics' (Kenney 2013, 139) .
In South Africa the emergence of this narrative has played out around the two Constitutional provisions that the judiciary be 'appropriately qualified' and 'broadly representative'. In the JSC's first two decades of appointments, critics have often framed the two provisions as contradictory, or as existing in a hierarchy, with those who suggest that 'appropriately qualified' should always trump the call for However, it has been argued that South Africa is a context in which the rewriting of merit to value diversity has gone further than most (see Mogadime 2005) and in which the Constitutional provisions 'move beyond' calls for diversity within the judiciary, 'pursuing representivity instead ' (Du Bois 2006, 282) . In post-1994 South Africa the argument that the judiciary must be 'diverse' in composition has been won. The Constitutional Court has argued that it is appropriate for judges to bring their life experiences to the act of adjudication, providing 'a powerful rationale for judicial diversity' (Wesson and Du Plessis 2009, 48 ). Yet the powerful narrative of merit versus diversity has surfaced around the pace of change and the 'balance' of differences. The meaning of transformation has also been contested -with an increasing number of critical observers now pushing for more attention to be paid to the values of judicial candidates amid the 'troubling racial disharmony' of public debate over judicial appointments (Cowen 2010, 9) .
Within this there is a complex story to tell about the ways in which women and black men have been incorporated into the judiciary and been entangled with the politics of the Constitutional Court's newness. In press discourses on judicial appointments there are a number of patterns that can be observed.
A dominant set of voices, made up of legal journalists writing in the English-language press and their sources from within the legal professions, legal professional bodies and politicians, have routinely associated white bodies with the old, with continuity and legal tradition, with ability and merit, with being independent-minded and descriptions such as 'reserved' or 'aloof'. transformation. At around the same time as this discursive 'leap' the discourse on transformation of the judiciary also began to broaden out and a wider range of civil society groups and those supportive of faster and more through-going judicial transformation focused on values began to join public debates over appointments more forcefully. In the conclusion I offer some reflections on this apparent shift and its possible implications for those leading the call for more women judges in South Africa.
1994: Birth of a new Court.
In 1994 the first eleven judges of the newly established Constitutional Court were appointed in three stages. In the first, a President of the Court, Arthur Chaskalson was appointed directly by President Nelson Mandela in May 1994. Chaskalson's appointment as head of the Constitutional Court (initially President and later Chief Justice) signaled that whilst the South African legal tradition, and judiciary, was being challenged by the new court, the roots of this challenge came from within: from the lawyers and academics who had used law in the struggle against apartheid. Chaskalson was a human rights advocate who in 1978 co-founded the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), along with John Dugard, the most prominent academic critic of apartheid-era judicial positivism and the upholding of unjust laws. The LRC was the epicentre of 'cause-lawyering' during the 1980s states of emergency and home to an oppositional 'vision of law capable of carrying the country through the transition' (Roux 2013, 222) .
From the appointment of Chaskalson onwards the Constitutional Court had a particularly strong relationship with the section of the South African legal community that had been involved in human rights litigation under apartheid. Roux has suggested that the court represented a 'triumph of the oppositional tradition over its discredited opponent' (Roux 2013, 220) . Reconstructing the debate over appointments shows that even before the first bench was complete, legal journalists (and their sources within the legal professions) seemed to expect appointments to the Constitutional Court for lawyers and academics from the oppositional human rights community. The media tied this expectation to what they framed as 'known' white men despite the fact that whilst undoubtedly being dominated by white lawyers due to the demographics of the legal profession, 'cause lawyering' was by no means an exclusively white activity. However, the repeated links between 'cause lawyering' and certain white men made at this time strengthened a slippage between whiteness and 'independence of mind'.
In the second stage of constituting the first Constitutional Court bench in August 1994, four judges were appointed, who had to be drawn from the ranks of the existing judiciary. The announcement of these appointees provoked criticism that certain individuals had been overlooked. Within prominent English-language newspapers such as the Sunday Times and the Weekly Mail and Guardian, a dominant narrative pitted 'known' white male candidates against 'unknown' and undifferentiated black candidates, and framed the decision not to appoint the 'known' white men as 'exclusion'. Two individuals in particular were named. Judge John Didcott was described as a man who had 'practically invented prohuman rights judicial activism in this country' and was deemed to be a 'natural choice' (Cowling 1994a; Rickard, 1994) . Similarly, Judge Pierre Olivier was seen as 'an obvious choice' (Rickard 1994) . It was 13 suggested that these individuals had not been appointed 'because the authorities felt that they could not risk too many strongly independent voices' (Rickard 1994) . A Professor of Law at Wits University was quoted in the Mail and Guardian as commenting that Didcott was 'male, white and independent-minded and that's three strokes against him' (Cowling 1994a) .
Of those who were appointed, Richard Goldstone, Ismail Mahomed, Laurie Ackermann and Tholakele Madala. Goldstone and Madala were the most 'controversial'. Goldstone, because he would be absent for the first two years of the Court's life having just taken up a post as the chief prosecutor for the United Nations at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and not, it was noted 'because anybody questioned his suitability for the post' (Rickard 1994) . In contrast, Madala, the first black African man to be appointed to the Court was described anonymously to the Sunday Times legal correspondent Carmel Rickard as 'a legal non-entity' and an example of 'tokenism', whose appointment 'over' Didcott and Olivier was 'unacceptable' (1994). Madala's own human rights record as an advocate and as a law student involved in founding a legal aid clinic was not reported by Rickard, a point made You are a new court in every way. The process whereby you were selected was new. When we look at you, we see for the first time the many dimensions of our rich and varied country. We see a multiplicity of backgrounds and life experiences. Your tasks are new. Your powers are new. We hope that, without abandoning the many sterling virtues of legal tradition, you will find a new way of expressing the great truths of your calling (Mandela 1995) .
The first bench of the Constitutional Court was majority white and male but an overall composition that included black and women judges was vital for the Court's legitimacy, articulated by Mandela as resting 'for the first time' on 'the many dimensions of our rich and varied country'. Sara Ahmed has noted that for an institution, visible '[racial] diversity can conceal whiteness by providing an organisation with colour', but it can also 'expose whiteness by demonstrating the necessity of this act of provision' (Ahmed 2013, 33) . This tension was downplayed in the South African media at the inauguration of the Constitutional Court, by a focus upon judges' choice of language when swearing their oaths of office, a story which amplified the voices and presence of the black judges.
Most media reports of the event focussed upon two signs of newness: the judges' newly designed dark green robes, which emphasised the appearance of change whilst drawing attention away from the actual bodies wearing the robes; and their choice of language in swearing their oaths of office. The 
1995-2008: How to count transformation?
During the first fifteen years of post-apartheid democracy a steady trickle of appointments were made to the Constitutional Court at the same time as the broader profile of South Africa's judiciary was reshaped by the JSC (see Table 1 ). There was a subtly different way in which men and women's bodies were Rickard 1996). The contrast was an embodied one in reports of the JSC interviews which noted Mahomed's 'bonhomie' and 'passion' against Van Heerden's 'reserved and more traditional figure' (Carter 1996) .
In the reporting of appointments to the Constitutional Court male judges were also often differentiated as individuals to a much greater extent than the only other woman to be appointed during the first fifteen years, Bess Nkabinde. For example, the reporting of Zak Yacoob appointed in 1997 stands out for the emphasis on his individuality. In a profile of Yacoob, published in Business Day, shortly before he took up his post on the Constitutional Court, the new judge was quoted as stating that:
The uniqueness which I have to add to the Constitutional Court is a combination of my experience which arises out of my disability, my involvement in the struggle for democracy and my involvement in a commercial and legal practice as a blind person. I do not think you will find another such person in this country (Lamberti 1998 ).
Yacoob laid claim to an embodied contribution that was utterly unique. In this way he did not claim to be representative of a particular constituency but instead suggested that the Constitutional Court was home to a special set of perspectives on South Africa, his now included. However, in instances that the contest for appointment was seen as being between black and white men, 'unknown' blackness continued to be pitted against renowned whiteness. In 1999 it was reported that the appointment of Edwin Cameron to the Constitutional Court had been 'blocked' by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki in favour of the strongest black candidate Sandile Ngcobo (Steinberg 1999a ). In the media's framing of Cameron's appointment as 'blocked', like the earlier 'exclusion', prominent legal journalists suggested that the trajectories of these white male bodies was natural, and was being interrupted. Media descriptions of the two candidates contrasted Cameron as 'one of the finest jurists of his generation', 'unmatched' and capable of 'progressive and creative jurisprudence' with appraisals of Ngcobo ranging from, 'able' and 'solid', whose appointment was 'by no means a scandal', to, 'this entirely unknown entity' (Steinberg 1999a; 1999b) . 8 Assessments from those within the legal system were circulated by anonymous comment, giving the impression they were 'institutional speech acts' despite their unofficial nature (Ahmed 2012, 143) . As Kenney has put it when discussing the circulation of such stories, setting aside the presumptions of Cameron's 'brilliance' or Ngcobo's 'solidity', 'it is noteworthy' that voices from within the legal profession would voice such opinions and that the media would report them in the framework of a merit versus diversity narrative (Kenney 2013, 142) . Court to submit reports on racism and sexism, a process which resulted in recommendations including a committee to hear complaints of racism and sexism, and a diversity training programme for judges.
In the immediate aftermath of the Hlophe report, during JSC interviews in April of 2005, women judges told the Commission about their experiences of being treated as 'invisible' and ignored by male colleagues (Rickard 2005a) . Later the same year, the same legal journalist Carmel Rickard also reported on sexism, this time that which was evident in the JSC's own questioning of women judicial candidates (Rickard 2005b) . In this first decade women lawyers and judges experiences of sexism within the legal profession and during the appointments process, when it was reported, was framed as the result of 'a clubby old boy network of the past' (Russell 1995) . As Rickard (2005b) women brought 'a special contribution' to the judiciary (Sapa 2009 ). She argued that women brought a different perspective to adjudication but also that female judges would help women have more confidence in the judicial system. However, Khampepe's appointment was framed in the media as 'disappointing', since the number of women on the bench had fallen from three, back to two (Rabkin 2009c ). Again, the media's focus was simply upon presence and absence when it came to women judges. Legal organisations wrote to the JSC objecting to Mogoeng's nomination but so too did trade unions, public interest law organisations, feminist, lesbian and gay activist, and HIV activist organisations. In total there were 21 sets of comments on Mogoeng's nomination sent to the JSC (Marcus and Brickhill 2012) . The objections raised were largely based on judgements written by Judge Mogoeng which led many to doubt his commitment to gender and sexual equality enshrined in the Bill of Rights, as well as concerns over his career as a state advocate in the former homeland of Bophutswana between 1986 and 1990, where he was accused of 'actively' pushing for the application of the death penalty (Kendal 2011) .
A number of cases were cited by Mogoeng's opponents in which he had reduced the sentences of men facing charges of assaulting and raping women who were their wives or girlfriends, on grounds such as the attack was 'provoked' by the woman who also 'did not sustain serious injuries' or equally disturbingly, that rape by an estranged husband was 'less traumatic than if the woman had been raped by a stranger' (Kendal 2011) . There were also questions over his dissent from the Constitutional Court judgment in Le Roux and others v. Dey (2011) in which the Court ruled that a person could not be defamed by being labelled as homosexual. The Johannesburg Bar Council indicated that 'his dissent indicates that he would, in fact, have found that it could be defamatory simply to refer to a person as being homosexual' and as such indicated a 'prejudicial attitude to members of the gay community' (Sapa 2011 Mogoeng's JSC interview was a high-profile event, lasting an unprecedented two days, and made for a compelling personal drama with the overlooked Deputy Chief Justice acting as chair of the JSC.
Described by one commentator as 'momentous' (Calland 2013) , it was broadcast live on national radio, and unusually, in-full on pay-per-view television and in-part on national terrestrial television. Prior to the interview the JSC voted against a suggestion by some of its members that they debate whether the JSC could accept other nominations, (it had been mooted that the opposition party the Democratic Alliance wished to nominate Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke). However, despite the wide-ranging and thorough interview, the JSC appeared to adhere to a narrow interpretation of its role as passing judgement only on whether the nominee minimally met the constitutional criteria of 'appropriately qualified' and 'fit and proper'. So, whilst the appointment process was highly visible, so too was the criticism that the decision to appoint Mogoeng had already been made by the President and his public interview would have no influence on the process. The elevation of Mogoeng to Chief Justice received a huge amount of attention and galvanised a wide range of actors into pushing for greater attention to be paid to prospective judges' record of jurisprudence. In the aftermath of this debate, the lack of women judges was raised as a further critique of the JSC and transformation, and the suggestion was made that the appointment of women judges would be a sign of 'real' transformation (see for example De Vos 2013) .
The simultaneous criticism of the role of the JSC and audible calls for more women judges Justice 'pre-empted' calls for the immanent vacancy on the Constitutional Court to be filled by a woman judge by stating publically that this was his personal preference (Rabkin 2014 ). This appears to mark a small success for those lobbying for more women judges in South Africa and a reinsertion of gender into the transformation agenda. The Chief Justice's seizing of the initiative may be an indication of the usefulness of women as a sign of the new for his own personal reputation, given the public criticism of his gender credentials, as well as the need to burnish the institutional reputation of the Constitutional Court and the JSC.
Conclusions
The should be' (quoted in Broun 2000, 194) . As a site for ongoing claims to newness the South African Constitutional Court offers a chance to explore the politics of newness and the ways in which institutional claims to be old or new are entangled with bodies and particularly performances of race and gender.
Paying attention to the politics of newness leads us to be sceptical when institutional newness is announced by the inclusion of bodies. However, the efforts to untangle the politics of newness should not be understood as simply unmasking 'the new' as 'just another version of the old'. In fact, the intention is rather just the opposite: to trace the ways in which even that which appears to be old, is in fact new. This is the impulse that lies behind delineating the precise forms that 'backlash' to social or political change takes. It may be as Sara Ahmed puts it that 'solutions to problems are the problems given new forms' (2013, 143) .
In South Africa, forms of backlash against judicial diversity have become intertwined with progressive critiques of the transformation of the judiciary, in complex ways. Race as the prime signifier of 'change' in the Court's early years has become deeply embroiled with questions over the independence of judges and disquiet at the superficiality of a transformation agenda that might simply be 'replacing old guard (white) patriarchs with new order (black and white) patriarchs ' (De Vos 2013) . Within this, an oft repeated association between white male candidates and 'independence' builds upon powerful discourses of whiteness as uniquely without social location. The emergence of calls for more women judges has, in some cases been interlinked with this framing, placing women as 'outside' of the politicisation of race.
For example, Richard Calland attributed the following motives to one woman judge, who he claimed had initially agreed to be nominated for the Constitutional Court in 2012 but later withdrew:
'She no longer trusted the JSC process as it had become too politicised. She thought it was a foregone conclusion that Justice Zondo would be appointed; besides, she did not really want to serve a court led by Chief Justice Mogoeng' (Calland 2013 ).
The 'peculiar status' of women as a sign of the new that was evident to Shireen Hassim (2006, 162) during the transition has, it seems, resurfaced in the public discourse over the transformation of the Kenney (2013, 135-139) .
apartheid, given the history of law in South Africa has puzzled many observers. Some have suggested that the timing of South Africa's transition as concurrent with 'the ascendancy of rights based constitutionalism in international political culture', and ANC exiles contact with this culture, as an explanation (Klug 2010) . Others have emphasized the 'memory' of the, albeit compromised, application of 'formal rational law' under apartheid as providing a bedrock of trust in the law (Meierhenrich 2010) . It may well also be as Martin Chanock has argued that the commitment to legality intensified during 'the protracted constitution-making processes', because the negotiations 'were accompanied by a counterpoint of violence which, paradoxically, led to an exaggeration of the security that would be provided by a new legality ' (2001: 513) .
3 It should be noted that there were also some calls from within the ANC for a more open appointments system that would get away from 'closed systems and cronyism', see Corder (1992, 207-209) for a summary of the debate in the early 1990s. 5 Both tables disaggregate simply 'black' and 'white' and 'male' and 'female', these are broad constructions that contain much within them. I use these broad constructions not out of a wish to erase the differences within but out of ambivalence at categorising in this way. They are also the most meaningful categories to refer to since it was along white/black and male/female binaries that historical exclusions from the judiciary operated. 
